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A	Neglected	Additament:	Peirce	on	Logic,	Cosmology,	and	the	Reality	of	God	
Abstract	
Two	different	versions	of	the	ending	of	the	first	additament	to	C.	S.	Peirce's	1908	article,	"A	
Neglected	Argument	for	the	Reality	of	God,"	appear	in	the	Collected	Papers	but	were	omitted	
from	 The	 Essential	 Peirce.	 In	 one,	 he	 linked	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 God's	 Reality	 to	 his	 entire	
theory	of	logic	as	semeiotic,	claiming	that	proving	the	latter	would	also	prove	the	former.	In	
the	 other,	 he	 offered	 a	 final	 outline	 of	 his	 cosmology,	 in	 which	 the	 Reality	 of	 God	 as	 Ens	
necessarium	 is	 indispensable	 to	both	 the	origin	and	order	of	our	existing	universe	of	Signs.	
Exploring	these	passages,	as	well	as	the	unpublished	manuscript	drafts	of	the	article,	provides	
important	 insights	 into	 the	 key	 concepts	 of	 instinct	 and	 continuity	 within	 Peirce's	
comprehensive	system	of	thought.	
	
Keywords:	Peirce,	God,	logic,	instinct,	cosmology,	continuity,	semeiotic	
	
1.	Introduction	
Charles	Sanders	Peirce's	article	in	the	October	1908	issue	of	The	Hibbert	Journal,	"A	Neglected	
Argument	 for	 the	 Reality	 of	 God"	 (hereinafter	 "A	 Neglected	 Argument"),	 has	 long	 been	
controversial	among	scholars	of	his	thought.	Some	consider	it	to	be	one	of	his	most	significant	
writings,	 while	 others	 find	 it	 problematic	 for	 one	 reason	 or	 another.	 Unfortunately,	 its	
presentation	 in	 volume	 6	 of	 the	 Collected	 Papers	 has	 occasionally	 caused	 confusion	 in	 the	
secondary	 literature.	 It	 includes	 the	 text	 as	 it	 originally	 appeared	 in	 print	 as	 CP1	 6.452-485,	
followed	by	an	"Additament"	as	CP	6.486-491,	and	then	a	section	on	"Knowledge	of	God"	as	CP	
6.492-493.	Accompanying	footnotes	date	CP	6.486-491	"c.	1910,"	state	that	CP	6.491	"is	from	
an	alternate	draft,"	and	reveal	that	CP	6.492-493	is	actually	"From	an	unpaginated	fragment,	c.	
1896."	
The	Peirce	Edition	Project	(PEP)	included	"A	Neglected	Argument"	in	volume	2	of	The	Essential	
Peirce	(EP2	2:434-450)	and	provided	an	endnote	with	helpful	background	information:	
	
At	the	end	of	July	1908,	the	Hibbert	editor,	L.	P.	Jacks,	let	Peirce	know	…	that	he	found	
Peirce's	 contribution	 to	 be	 of	 "permanent	 value,"	 but	 that,	 because	 of	 the	 paper's	
complexity,	he	wanted	Peirce	"to	summarize	the	article	in	a	concluding	page	or	two,	to	
be	added	to	the	article"	…	Peirce	wrote	two	versions	of	his	addendum,	which	he	called	
"Additament."	Jacks	published	the	second	one	without	title,	a	mere	blank	line	serving	to	
separate	it	from	the	end	of	the	article.	(EP	2:551n14)	
	
It	turns	out	that	CP	6.452-480	is	the	article	proper,	CP	6.481-485	is	the	second	additament,	CP	
6.486-490	 is	 the	 first	 additament—composed	 in	 1908,	 not	 1910—and	 CP	 6.491	 is	 part	 of	 a	
different	ending	for	the	latter.	Consequently,	the	PEP	editors	chose	another	arrangement:	
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The	"Additament"	published	in	the	present	edition	combines	the	first	five	paragraphs	of	
Peirce's	first	version	of	the	text	…	with	the	full	text	of	the	second	version.	The	reason	for	
this	amalgamation	 is	 that	only	 in	 the	 first	version	did	Peirce	clearly	 identify	 "a	nest	of	
three	arguments"	that	is	then	referred	to	in	the	second	version.	(EP	2:551n14)	
	
As	a	result	of	this	decision,	except	for	the	first	two	sentences—one	in	the	main	text,	the	other	
in	an	endnote—CP	6.490-491	is	omitted	entirely.	The	PEP	editors	explained	their	rationale	for	
this:	
	
The	bracketed	ellipsis	at	the	end	of	the	previous	paragraph	indicates	that	the	text	of	the	
first	"Additament"	continues	beyond	that	sentence	(for	three	pages	and	a	half)	but	has	
not	been	included	here	to	avoid	both	a	rough	transition	and	an	overlap.	(EP	2:551n15)	
	
However,	 both	 versions	 of	 the	missing	 content	 contain	 a	 fair	 amount	 of	material	 that	 is	not	
duplicated	in	the	second	additament,	and	hence	is	absent	from	EP	altogether.	That	is	the	basis	
for	the	title	of	this	essay,	which	explores	the	key	ideas	that	Peirce	discussed	in	those	passages,	
as	well	as	the	unpublished	manuscript	drafts	of	"A	Neglected	Argument"	(R3	841-844;	1908).	
	
We	will	begin	with	Peirce's	bold	claim	that	merely	recognizing	the	soundness	of	his	theory	of	
logic	 as	 semeiotic	 would,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 degree,	 also	 warrant	 adopting	 the	 hypothesis	 of	
God's	 Reality.	 This	 leads	 to	 his	 arguments	 for	 humanity's	 surprising	 efficiency	 at	 making	
accurate	conjectures	about	nature,	which	prompted	him	to	acknowledge	an	objection	that	can	
only	be	addressed	after	delving	 into	 the	details	of	his	cosmological	account	of	 the	origin	and	
order	 of	 our	 existing	 universe	 of	 Signs.	 This	 in	 turn	 hinges	 on	 Peirce's	 phenomenological	
Categories	 of	 Firstness,	 Secondness,	 and	 Thirdness—hereinafter	 1ns,	 2ns,	 and	 3ns	 for	
convenience4—and	 their	 proper	 arrangement	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 Being,	 which	 he	 helpfully	
illustrated	using	 iconic	diagrams	embodying	the	significant	 relations	among	the	parts	of	what	
they	represent.	The	resulting	summary	is	Peirce's	description	of	creation	as	God's	great	symbol,	
argument,	and	poem,	emphasizing	the	underlying	continuity	of	all	things—i.e.,	of	Reality	itself.	
	
2.	Peirce's	Theory	of	Thinking	
Although	 it	 comes	 last,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 CP	 6.491	 was	 in	 the	 initial	 draft	 ending	 of	 the	 first	
additament,	 and	 that	 this	 was	 later	 replaced	 by	 CP	 6.489-490.	 There	 are	 only	 minor	
discrepancies	through	the	citation	of	a	1904	article	by	William	James,	but	what	follow	are	very	
different	characterizations	of	the	third	"peculiarity	of	the	hypothesis"	of	God's	Reality.	CP	6.490	
affirms	 "its	 commanding	 influence	 over	 the	whole	 conduct	 of	 life	 of	 its	 believers,"	 while	 CP	
6.491—restored	to	how	Peirce	originally	wrote	it—states	the	following:	
	
On	the	other	hand,	among	the	many	pertinent	considerations	which	have	been	crowded	
out	of	this	article,	I	may	just	mention,	in	the	third	place,	that	it	could	have	been	shown	
that	 the	 hypothesis	 of	God's	 Reality	 is	 logically	 not	 so	 isolated	 a	 conclusion	 as	 it	may	
seem.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	so	connected	with	a	theory	of	the	nature	of	thinking,	that	if	
this	 be	 proved,	 so	 is	 that.	 Now	 there	 is	 no	 such	 difficulty	 in	 tracing	 experiential	
consequences	of	this	theory	of	thinking	as	there	are	in	attempting	directly	to	trace	out	
other	consequences	of	God's	reality.	(R	844:13[4])	
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Here	Peirce	acknowledged	an	important	way	in	which	the	retroductive	conjecture	of	the	Reality	
of	 God	 is	 unlike	 a	 typical	 scientific	 hypothesis:	 It	 does	 not	 readily	 lend	 itself	 to	 deductive	
explication	 and	 inductive	 evaluation.5	 He	 proposed	 instead	 undertaking	 those	 steps	with	 his	
"theory	of	the	nature	of	thinking,"	claiming	that	the	link	between	the	two	is	such	that	proving	
the	 latter—which	 he	 evidently	 viewed	 as	 a	 much	 easier	 task—would	 suffice	 to	 prove	 the	
former.	 This	 raises	 several	 interesting	 questions:	 (1)	 To	what	was	 Peirce	 referring	 here	 as	 "a	
theory	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 thinking"?	 (2)	 How	 is	 it	 connected	 logically	 with	 "the	 hypothesis	 of	
God's	Reality"?	(3)	What	"experiential	consequences	of	this	theory	of	thinking"	could	we,	with	
comparatively	 little	 difficulty,	 deductively	 trace	 and	 inductively	 test	 in	 order	 to	 prove	 it?	 (4)	
Would	that	really	also	prove	"the	hypothesis	of	God's	Reality"?	
Both	"theory	of	the	nature	of	thinking"	and	"theory	of	thinking"	were	unusual	expressions	for	
Peirce	 to	 employ;	 neither	 appears	 elsewhere	 in	 CP	 or	 EP.	 He	 did	 state	 that	 "Logic,	 regarded	
from	 one	 instructive,	 though	 partial	 and	 narrow,	 point	 of	 view,	 is	 the	 theory	 of	 deliberate	
thinking"	 (CP	1.573,	EP	2.376;	1906).	 In	 the	draft	preface	 for	a	book	whose	working	 title	was	
Meaning,	Peirce	also	wrote	that	"logic	 is	the	theory	of	thinking	so	far	as	thinking	conduces	to	
the	 attainment	 of	 truth"	 (R	 634:11;	 1909),	 and	 added	 that	 "in	 the	 present	 state	 of	 our	
knowledge	logic	should	be	regarded	as	coextensive	with	General	Semeiotic,	the	a	priori	theory	
of	 signs"	 (R	 634:15).	 Hence	 he	 presumably	 had	 in	 mind	 his	 entire	 broad	 notion	 of	 "Logic	
considered	as	Semeiotic"	(CP	8.377;	1908)	when	he	wrote	"A	Neglected	Argument."	
There	are	other	 clues	 in	 the	 related	manuscripts.	The	published	article—also	 found	 in	R	841,	
with	 minor	 differences—contains	 a	 somewhat	 lengthy	 rendition	 of	 what	 Peirce	 named	 the	
"humble	argument"	in	both	additaments,	followed	by	a	relatively	brief	discussion	of	the	three	
Stages	of	Inquiry	and	their	logical	validity.	However,	what	appears	to	be	the	very	first	draft	has	
it	the	other	way	around,	as	these	introductory	comments	anticipate:	
	
Yet	 this	argument	has	 seldom	been	much	 insisted	upon	by	 theologians	 for	 the	 reason	
that,	persuasive	as	it	is,	it	has	not	seemed	to	them	to	be	logical.	This	I	conceive	has	been	
due	 to	 a	 false	 theory	 of	 logic;	 and	 consequently	 the	 main	 substance	 of	 the	 present	
paper	must	be	a	brief	abstract	of	a	defence	of	a	theory	of	logic	according	to	which	the	
theological	argument	in	question	is	as	logically	sound	as	it	certainly	is	persuasive.	
Thus,	 I	am	to	outline	two	arguments,	one	supporting	the	other.	The	latter,	which	I	will	
designate	as	the	humble	argument,	although	every	mind	can	feel	its	force,	rests	on	far	
too	many	premisses	to	be	stated	in	full.	Taking	the	general	description	of	it	as	a	minor	
premiss,	 and	 a	 certain	 theory	 of	 logic	 as	 a	 major	 premiss,	 it	 will	 follow	 by	 a	 simple	
syllogism	 that	 the	 humble	 argument	 is	 logical	 and	 that	 consequently	 whoever	
acknowledges	its	premisses	need	have	no	scruple	in	accepting	its	conclusion.	(R	842:10-
11)	
	
What	Peirce	here	called	"a	certain	theory	of	logic"	is	presumably	the	same	thing	as	"a	theory	of	
the	nature	of	thinking"	and	"this	theory	of	thinking"	in	CP	6.491.	It	is	the	major	premiss,	and	"a	
general	 description	 of"	 the	 humble	 argument	 is	 the	 minor	 premiss,	 of	 "a	 simple	 syllogism"	
whose	conclusion	is	"that	the	humble	argument	is	logical."	Notice	the	modesty	of	this	assertion;	
rather	than	demonstrating	the	Reality	of	God,	Peirce	sought	merely	to	show	that	anyone	who	
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embraces	his	 theory	of	 logic,	 and	 recognizes	 that	 the	humble	argument	 is	 consistent	with	 it,	
"need	have	no	scruple	in	accepting	its	conclusion."6	He	continued:	
	
Only,	 of	 course,	 it	 becomes	 necessary	 to	 establish	 the	 major	 premise,	 which	 is	 the	
theory	 of	 logic;	 and	 it	 is	 sufficiently	 clear	 that	 to	 do	 this	 in	 a	 thoroughly	 satisfactory	
manner	would	involve	going	over	the	whole	of	the	critical	branch	of	logic	and	showing	
that	 the	 theory	 in	 question	 satisfactorily	 explains	 every	 variety	 of	 argument.	 Now	 I	
cannot,	within	reasonable	limits,	consider	more	than	the	main	genera	of	arguments.	So	
much,	 I	 will	 do.	 The	 subsidiary	 arguments	 of	 a	 mixed	 character,	 although	 highly	
important	in	actual	reasonings,	cannot,	within	my	limits,	be	considered.	Moreover,	the	
critical	 branch	 of	 logic	 really,	 even	 more	 than	 apparently,	 depends	 upon	 the	 very	
difficult	and	still	vexed	analytical	branch,	whose	problems	could	not	easily	be	brought	to	
the	 apprehension	 of	 ordinary	 readers,	 to	 say	 nothing	 of	 the	 task	 of	 laying	 the	
foundations	for	their	scientific	solutions.	(R	842:11-13)	
	
This	confirms	the	wide	scope	of	Peirce's	"theory	of	 logic,"	encompassing	not	only	the	"critical	
branch,"	 but	 also	 the	 "analytical	 branch"	 on	 which	 it	 depends,	 which	 he	 elsewhere	 called	
"speculative	grammar"	(e.g.,	CP	2.93;	1902	and	CP	1.191,	EP	2:260;	1903).	The	difficulty	of	the	
problems	 posed	 by	 the	 latter,	 to	 which	 Peirce	 here	 alluded,	 is	 familiar	 to	 anyone	 who	 has	
wrestled	with	 his	 various	 attempts	 to	 classify	 Signs	 during	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 twentieth	
century.	What	 he	 emphasized	 next,	 to	 make	 up	 for	 his	 inability	 to	 lay	 everything	 out	 "in	 a	
thoroughly	satisfactory	manner,"	is	telling:	
	
But	 fortunately,	we	have	an	 instinct	 for	 that	which	 is	 rational,	 and	upon	 that	ordinary	
readers	ought	 to	 rely.	Accordingly,	while	 I	 cannot	here	present	 a	 thoroughly	 scientific	
defence	of	my	theory	of	logic,	I	shall	hope	to	make	it	appear	reasonable.	(R	842:13-14)	
	
Despite	this	stated	misgiving,	after	a	single	paragraph	outlining	the	"humble	argument,"	Peirce	
proceeded	 to	write	dozens	of	pages	expounding	on	 the	 three	 stages	of	a	 complete	 inquiry—
retroduction,	 deduction,	 and	 (especially)	 induction—in	 considerable	 detail.	 Some	 of	 this	 text	
appears	as	CP	2.755-772	under	the	heading,	"The	Varieties	and	Validity	of	Induction,"	but	with	
no	indication	that	 it	 is	connected	with	"A	Neglected	Argument";	 in	fact,	 it	 is	 incorrectly	dated	
"c.	1905."	
Two	different	versions	of	the	last	several	paragraphs	terminate	with	equal	abruptness.	Perhaps	
Peirce	 realized	 that	 he	 had	 far	 exceeded	 the	 allotted	 length	 and	 would	 have	 to	 start	 over,	
almost	from	scratch.	In	any	case,	a	later	fragment	includes	this	summary:	
	
My	 main	 concern	 is	 to	 show	 that	 that	 line	 of	 reflexion	 which	 I	 call	 the	 Neglected	
Argument	 is	an	argument,	and	a	particularly	 strong	one,	of	 the	kind	with	which	every	
positive	scientific	 inquisition	must	begin.	The	 lowliest	minds	will	 rest	content	with	this	
without	any	fault	in	their	conclusion	or	their	logic;	while	the	more	critical,	may	still	their	
lingering	 doubts,	 by	 completing	 the	 line	 of	 inquiry	 which	 the	 Neglected	 Argument	
opens;	 while	 on	 its	 concomitants	 they	 may	 base	 another	 Argument	 supporting	 the	
former,	and	so	be	 led	on	to	further	reflections,	remarks,	and	experiences	which	attain	
all	the	force	of	sound	induction,	the	highest	grade	of	certainty	to	which	the	human	mind	
can	attain	on	any	Real	subject.	(R	843:36-37[6-7])	
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Peirce	here	implied	that	for	many—perhaps	most—the	humble	argument	is	sufficient	by	itself	
to	ground	belief	in	the	Reality	of	God;	and	for	those	not	fully	satisfied	by	it,	it	serves	instead	as	
the	initial	step	of	a	more	rigorous	investigation.	Both	outcomes	are	consistent	with	his	"theory	
of	the	nature	of	thinking,"	as	captured	in	this	imaginative	metaphor	from	the	published	article:	
	
Over	 the	 chasm	 that	 yawns	 between	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 science	 and	 such	 ideas	 of	
Man's	environment	as,	 coming	over	him	during	his	primeval	wanderings	 in	 the	 forest,	
while	yet	his	very	notion	of	error	was	of	 the	vaguest,	he	managed	to	communicate	to	
some	fellow,	we	are	building	a	cantilever	bridge	of	induction,	held	together	by	scientific	
struts	and	ties.	Yet	every	plank	of	its	advance	is	first	laid	by	Retroduction	alone,	that	is	
to	say,	by	the	spontaneous	conjectures	of	instinctive	reason;	and	neither	Deduction	nor	
Induction	contributes	a	single	new	concept	to	the	structure.	Nor	is	this	less	true	or	less	
important	for	those	inquiries	that	self-interest	prompts.	(CP	6.475,	EP	2:443,	R	841:50-
51)	
	
We	may	now	formulate	Peirce's	"simple	syllogism"	accordingly.	
	
Major	 premiss	 ("theory	 of	 logic"):	 Every	 process	 of	 thought	 that	 produces	 a	
spontaneous	conjecture	of	instinctive	reason	is	logical.		
Minor	 premiss	 ("general	 description"):	 The	 humble	 argument	 is	 a	 process	 of	 thought	
that	produces	a	spontaneous	conjecture	of	instinctive	reason.	
Conclusion:	"[T]he	humble	argument	is	logical."7	
	
3.	Peirce's	Pragmaticistic	Proofs	
Peirce	 indicated	 in	"A	Neglected	Argument"	 that	 the	primary	experiential	 consequence	of	his	
theory	 of	 thinking	 is	 that	 humans	 should	 exhibit	 a	 remarkable	 tendency	 to	 generate	
retroductive	 conjectures	 that	 successfully	 withstand	 subsequent	 deductive	 and	 inductive	
scrutiny.	He	 then	contended	that	 this	 is	exactly	what	we	 find	 to	be	 the	case,	attributing	 it	 to	
what	Galileo	called	"il	 lume	naturale"	and	advocating	"that	 it	 is	 the	simpler	Hypothesis	 in	the	
sense	of	the	more	facile	and	natural,	the	one	that	instinct	suggests,	that	must	be	preferred"	(CP	
6.477,	EP	2:444-445,	R	841:58).8	He	also	explicitly	rejected	the	alternative	explanation:	
	
But	may	they	not	have	come	fortuitously,	or	by	some	such	modification	of	chance	as	the	
Darwinian	supposes?	I	answer	that	three	or	four	independent	methods	of	computation	
show	 that	 it	 would	 be	 ridiculous	 to	 suppose	 our	 science	 to	 have	 so	 come	 to	 pass	 …	
There	is	a	reason,	an	interpretation,	a	logic,	in	the	course	of	scientific	advance;	and	this	
indisputably	proves	to	him	who	has	perceptions	of	rational,	or	significant,	relations,	that	
man's	mind	must	have	been	attuned	to	the	truth	of	things	in	order	to	discover	what	he	
has	discovered.	It	is	the	very	bed-rock	of	logical	truth.	(CP	6.476,	EP	2:444,	R	841:54-56)	
	
Peirce	included	specific	calculations	in	the	manuscripts	to	substantiate	this	claim.	In	one	draft,	
he	invoked	"the	game	of	twenty	questions"	(R	842:21),	in	which	even	the	best	players	usually	
require	the	full	allotment	of	"yes"	or	"no"	answers:	
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This	 shows	 that	 the	 class	 of	 objects	 from	 which	 the	 answerer	 will	 have	 made	 [h]is	
selection	 is	 composed	 of	 nearly	 220	 single	 objects,	 or	 about	 a	million.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	
pretty	 clear	 that	 the	 number	 of	 facts	 with	 any	 one	 of	 which	 a	 conjecture	 might	
conceivably	connect	a	surprising	fact	is,	at	the	very	least,	a	million.	Consequently,	if	the	
conjecturer	were	completely	in	the	dark	…	he	would,	on	the	average	have	to	make	some	
half	million	of	 utterly	wrong	 conjectures	before	he	 lit	 on	 the	 right	 one	…	The	darkest	
mysteries	 of	 nature,	 instead	 of	 half	 a	 million	 false	 conjectures,	 have	 not	 called	 for	 a	
score.	(R	842:22-24)	
	
Peirce	then	gave	as	examples	the	orbit	of	Mars	(18	false	hypotheses	by	Kepler	before	the	true	
one),	the	acceleration	of	a	falling	body	(only	one	by	Galileo),	and	the	nature	of	light	(seven	by	
various	 people	 over	 the	 centuries).	 He	 also	 cited	 "Bernoulli's	 kinetical	 theory	 of	 gases"	 and	
"Dalton's	 atomic	 theory"	 as	 instances	 when	 "the	 very	 first	 definite	 theories	 were	 right"	 (R	
842:25-26).	In	a	later	draft,	he	took	another	approach:	
	
It	 is	 evident	 …	 that	 there	 must	 be	 as	 many	 independent	 characters	 as	 there	 are	 of	
possible	 single	 things	 …	 and	 evidently	 there	 must	 be	 as	 many	 logically	 simple	
hypotheses	 that	might	be	proposed	 to	explain	any	given	hypothesis.	Now	well	 known	
facts	enable	us	to	assert	that	of	corpuscles	alone	there	are	more	than	1064	in	the	visible	
universe.	 But	 1014	 being	 the	 number	 of	 seconds	 in	 three	 million	 years	 exceeds	 the	
number	of	hypotheses	mankind	would	ever	yet	have	lit	upon	since	our	appearance	on	
earth;	 so	 that	 the	 odds	would	 be	 1050	 to	 1,—which	means	 "utterly	 overwhelming,"—
against	the	right	explanation	of	any	given	fact	having	ever	yet	entered	into	the	mind	of	
man	by	chance;	to	say	nothing	of	the	labor	of	testing	each	hypothesis.	(R	843:62&64[60-
61])	
	
Nevertheless,	 in	the	published	article,	Peirce	was	careful	not	to	overstate	the	prowess	of	this	
human	instinct:	
	
But	 is	 it	 a	 fact	 that	man	 possesses	 this	magical	 faculty?	Not,	 I	 reply,	 to	 the	 extent	 of	
guessing	right	the	first	 time,	nor	perhaps	the	second;	but	that	the	well-prepared	mind	
has	wonderfully	soon	guessed	each	secret	of	nature	is	historical	truth.	All	the	theories	of	
science	have	been	so	obtained.	(CP	6.476,	EP	4:444,	R	841:54)	
	 	
Spontaneous	conjectures	 that	qualify	as	genuine	 insights	are	only	 likely	 to	arise	 "wonderfully	
soon"	in	a	mind	that	is	"well-prepared."	Through	deliberate	training,	we	can	become	more	and	
more	"attuned	to	the	truth	of	things,"	especially	when	we	concentrate	on	a	particular	field	of	
inquiry.	
Even	if	these	"proofs"	of	Peirce's	theory	of	thinking	are	convincing,	there	is	still	the	matter	of	
whether	 this	 is	 adequate	 to	 "prove"	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 God's	 Reality.	 In	 CP	 6.491,	 Peirce	
admitted	an	"obvious"	and	"redoubtable"	objection:	
	
For	example,	 it	may	be	said	that	since	I	compare	man's	power	of	guessing	at	the	truth	
with	the	instincts	of	animals,	I	ought	to	have	noticed	that	these	are	entirely	explained	by	
the	action	of	natural	selection	 in	endowing	animals	with	such	powers	as	contribute	to	
the	preservation	of	their	different	stocks;	and	that	there	 is	evidence	that	man's	power	
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of	penetrating	the	secrets	of	nature	depends	upon	this,	in	the	fact	that	all	the	successful	
sciences	 have	 been	 either	 mechanical	 in	 respect	 to	 their	 theories	 or	 psychological	 …	
Metaphysics,	 however,	 cannot	 adapt	 the	 human	 race	 to	 maintaining	 itself,	 and	
therefore	 the	presumption	 is	 that	man	has	no	 such	genius	 for	discoveries	 about	God,	
Freedom,	and	Immortality,	as	he	has	for	physical	and	psychical	science;	and	the	history	
of	science	supports	this	view.	(R	844:14-15[5-6])	
	
Hartshorne	 and	 Weiss	 inserted	 CP	 6.492-493	 at	 this	 point,	 presumably	 to	 serve	 as	 Peirce's	
response,	 even	 though	 he	 wrote	 it	 more	 than	 a	 decade	 earlier.	 However,	 the	 manuscript	
includes	additional	remarks	that	serve	precisely	that	purpose:	
	
This	opens	an	interesting	question	of	logic	to	which	I	have	devoted	much	study,	with	the	
result	 of	 fully	 satisfying	 myself	 that	 man's	 power	 of	 divining	 the	 truth	 is	 not	 so	
circumscribed.	
My	 reply	 to	 this	objection	could	not	be	given	here	nor	 in	any	piece	 to	be	 read	at	one	
sitting.	My	reply	would	show	that	whatever	general	conduct	of	a	race	would	fit	or	disfit	
its	individuals	to	the	life	to	come,	may	be	expected	also	to	adapt	or	maladapt	the	race	
itself	 to	 maintaining	 its	 footing	 in	 this	 world;	 and	 further	 to	 show,	 through	 its	
pragmaticistic	interpretation,	that	the	belief	in	the	Ens	necessarium	would	according	as	
it	were	true	or	false,	fit	or	disfit	individuals	to	eternal	life	hereafter.	And	consequently,	
natural	selection	naturally	will	act	here	on	earth	to	the	cultivation	of	this	belief,	if	it	be	
true,	and	to	its	suppression	if	it	be	false,	just	as	it	acts	in	respect	to	ordinary	morality.	(R	
844:15[6])	
	
Since	Peirce	mentioned	 the	 "pragmaticistic	 interpretation"	of	 "the	belief	 in	Ens	necessarium"	
here,	 and	 offered	 "hints"	 regarding	 "the	 pragmaticistic	 definition	 of	 Ens	 necessarium"	 in	 CP	
6.490,	 unpacking	 this	 additional	 "neglected	 argument"	 requires	 first	 conducting	 a	 careful	
analysis	of	that	other	version	of	the	ending	of	the	first	additament.	
	
4.	Peirce's	Considered	Cosmology	
The	 published	 article	 begins	 by	 stating,	 "The	 word	 'God'	 …	 is	 the	 definable	 proper	 name,	
signifying	Ens	necessarium;	in	my	belief	Really	creator	of	all	three	Universes	of	Experience"	(CP	
6.452,	 EP	 2:434,	 R	 841:1).	 Although	 some	 have	 interpreted	 Peirce's	 views	 as	 amenable	 to	
pantheism	 or	 panentheism,	 in	 several	 manuscript	 fragments	 Peirce	 appended	 an	 emphatic	
denial	that	God	is	immanent	in	Nature	or	the	three	Universes:	
	 	
…	Who,	out	of	Nothing,	less	than	a	blank,	is	creating	all	three	Universes	of	experience.	I	
do	not	mean,	then,	a	"soul	of	the	World"	or	an	intelligence	is	"immanent"	in	Nature,	but	
is	the	Creator	of	the	three	Universes	of	minds,	of	matter,	and	of	ideal	possibilities,	and	
of	everything	in	them.	(R	843:11[1])	
	
Indeed,	meaning	 by	 "God,"	 as	 throughout	 this	 paper	will	 be	meant,	 the	 Being	whose	
Attributes	are,	 in	the	main,	those	usually	ascribed	to	Him,	Omniscience,	Omnipotence,	
Infinite	Benignity,	a	Being	not	"immanent	in"	the	Universes	of	Matter,	Mind,	and	Ideas,	
but	the	Sole	Creator	of	every	content	of	them	without	exception	…	(R	843:18&20[1-2])	
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But	I	had	better	add	that	I	do	not	mean	by	God	a	being	merely	"immanent	in	Nature,"	
but	I	mean	that	Being	who	has	created	every	content	of	the	world	of	ideal	possibilities,	
of	 the	 world	 of	 physical	 facts,	 and	 the	 world	 of	 all	 minds,	 without	 any	 exception	
whatever.	(R	843:25[4])	
	
These	 passages	 shed	 valuable	 light	 on	 not	 only	 Peirce's	 concept	 of	 God,	 but	 also	 the	 three	
Universes,	 which	 are	 metaphysical	 counterparts	 of	 the	 phenomenological	 Categories	 that	
pervaded	his	philosophical	thought:	1ns,	2ns,	and	3ns.9	"A	Neglected	Argument"	identifies	them	
as	consisting	of	(1)	Ideas,	(2)	Brute	Actuality,	and	(3)	Signs;	they	evidently	also	include	(1)	ideal	
possibilities,	(2)	Matter	and	physical	facts,	and	(3)	Mind	and	minds.	A	few	months	later,	Peirce	
gave	 similar	 descriptions	 of	 "three	Universes,	which	 are	 distinguished	 by	 three	Modalities	 of	
Being"—but	with	habits,	 laws,	and	(especially)	continua	as	constituents	of	the	third	one—in	a	
draft	 letter	 to	 Lady	 Victoria	Welby	 (EP	 2:478-479;	 1908),	where	 they	 served	 as	 the	 basis	 for	
dividing	his	ten	semeiotic	trichotomies	into	(1)	Possibles,	(2)	Existents,	and	(3)	Necessitants.	
The	second	additament	characterizes	the	humble	argument	as	"that	course	of	meditation	upon	
the	three	Universes	which	gives	birth	to	the	hypothesis	and	ultimately	to	the	belief	that	they,	or	
at	any	rate	two	of	the	three,	have	a	Creator	independent	of	them"	(CP	6.483,	EP	2:448).	Which	
one	might	not?	Peirce	provided	the	answer	in	one	of	the	drafts,	and	also	clarified	why	he	was	
arguing	for	the	Reality	of	God,	rather	than	the	existence	of	God:	
	
Thus,	 He	 is	 so	much	 like	 a	mind,	 and	 so	 little	 like	 a	 singular	 Existent	 (meaning	 by	 an	
Existent,	or	object	that	Exists,	a	thing	subject	to	brute	constraints,	and	reacting	with	all	
other	 Existents,)	 and	 so	 opposed	 in	 His	 Nature	 to	 an	 ideal	 possibility,	 that	 we	 may	
loosely	say	that	He	is	a	Spirit,	or	Mind.	(R	843:26[5])	
	
This	brings	us	to	CP	6.490:	
	
A	full	exposition	of	the	pragmaticistic	definition	of	Ens	necessarium	would	require	many	
pages;	but	some	hints	toward	it	may	be	given.	A	disembodied	spirit,	or	pure	mind,	has	
its	being	out	of	time,	since	all	that	 it	 is	destined	to	think	is	fully	 in	 its	being	at	any	and	
every	previous	 time.	But	 in	endless	 time	 it	 is	destined	 to	 think	all	 that	 it	 is	 capable	of	
thinking.	Order	 is	simply	thought	embodied	 in	arrangement;	and	thought	embodied	 in	
any	other	way	appears	objectively	as	a	character	that	 is	a	generalization	of	order,	and	
that,	 in	 the	 lack	 of	 any	 word	 for	 it,	 we	 may	 call	 for	 the	 nonce,	 'Super-order.'	 It	 is	
something	 like	 uniformity.	 The	 idea	may	 be	 caught	 if	 it	 is	 described	 as	 that	 of	which	
order	and	uniformity	are	particular	varieties.	Pure	mind,	as	creative	of	thought,	must,	so	
far	as	 it	 is	manifested	in	time,	appear	as	having	a	character	related	to	the	habit-taking	
capacity,	just	as	super-order	is	related	to	uniformity.	(R	844:6)	
	
God	is	"pure	mind,"	and	hence	may	not	be	completely	 independent	of	the	(third)	Universe	of	
Mind,	while	nevertheless	being	the	Creator	of	everything	else	 in	that	Universe,	as	well	as	the	
other	 two	Universes	 in	 their	 entirety.	Pure	mind	 is	 "out	of	 time"	and	 creates	 thought,	which	
when	"embodied	…	appears	objectively"	as	 "super-order,"	of	which	order	and	uniformity	are	
familiar	 exemplifications.	 The	 thought-creating	 character	 of	 pure	mind	 is	 to	 the	 habit-taking	
capacity	as	super-order	is	to	uniformity.	Since	uniformity	is	a	particular	variety	of	super-order,	
the	habit-taking	capacity	must	be	a	particular	variety	of	the	thought-creating	character	of	pure	
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mind.	 Note	 that	 all	 of	 these	 concepts—mind,	 thought,	 order,	 uniformity,	 habit-taking—are	
paradigmatic	examples	of	3ns.	
At	first	glance,	this	might	seem	to	contradict	Peirce's	earlier	cosmological	writings,	such	as	an	
oft-cited	narrative	in	"A	Guess	at	the	Riddle":	
	
Out	of	the	womb	of	indeterminacy	we	must	say	that	there	would	have	come	something,	
by	 the	principle	of	Firstness,	which	we	may	call	a	 flash.	Then	by	 the	principle	of	habit	
there	 would	 have	 been	 a	 second	 flash.	 Though	 time	 would	 not	 yet	 have	 been,	 this	
second	 flash	was	 in	 some	 sense	 after	 the	 first,	 because	 resulting	 from	 it.	 Then	 there	
would	have	come	other	successions	ever	more	and	more	closely	connected,	the	habits	
and	the	tendency	to	take	them	ever	strengthening	themselves,	until	 the	events	would	
have	been	bound	together	 into	something	 like	a	continuous	flow.	(CP	1.412,	EP	1:278;	
1887-1888)	
	
Most	 commentators	 have	 interpreted	 these	 and	 similar	 remarks	 as	 indicating	 that	 1ns	 came	
first,	so	to	speak,	followed	by	2ns	and	then	3ns—all	as	chance	events.10	Peirce	acknowledged	as	
much	in	one	manuscript	draft	of	"A	Neglected	Argument,"	calling	it	his	"original	hypothesis"	as	
defended	in	six	articles	in	The	Monist	of	1891-1893.11	However,	he	then	added:	
	
But	during	the	long	years	which	have	elapsed	since	the	hypothesis	first	suggested	itself	
to	me,	it	may	naturally	be	supposed	that	faulty	features	of	the	original	hypothesis	have	
been	brought	[to]	my	attention	by	others	and	have	struck	me	in	my	own	meditations	…	
Professor	Ogden	Rood	pointed	out	that	there	must	have	been	some	original	tendency	to	
take	habits	which	did	not	arise	according	to	my	hypothesis	…	(R	842:113-114[127-128])	
	
If	the	tendency	to	take	habits	was	truly	"original,"	then	3ns	must	have	preceded	1ns	and	2ns	in	
some	sense.12	Furthermore,	if	God	created	all	Ideas	(1ns)	and	Matter	(2ns),	while	God	Himself	is	
Mind	 (3ns),	 then	 the	 latter	must	be	primordial	 relative	 to	 the	other	 two.	As	we	will	 see,	 this	
resolution	 comes	 from	 recognizing	 that	 Peirce	 associated	 "the	womb	of	 indeterminacy"	with	
3ns,	rather	than	1ns	as	one	might	initially	assume.	
Returning	 to	 CP	 6.490,	 a	 difficult	 passage	 comes	 next.	 In	 context,	 it	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 a	
reductio	ad	absurdum	 for	any	claim	that	our	existing	universe	came	about	on	 its	own,	out	of	
absolutely	nothing:	
	
Now	imagine,	in	such	vague	way	as	such	a	thing	can	be	imagined,	a	perfect	cosmology	
of	 the	 three	universes.	 It	would	prove	all	 in	 relation	 to	 that	 subject	 that	 reason	could	
desiderate;	and	of	course	all	that	it	would	prove	must,	 in	actual	fact,	now	be	true.	But	
reason	would	desiderate	that	that	should	be	proved	from	which	would	follow	all	that	is	
in	 fact	 true	of	 the	 three	universes;	and	 the	postulate	 from	which	all	 this	would	 follow	
must	not	state	any	matter	of	fact,	since	such	fact	would	thereby	be	left	unexplained.	(R	
844:6-7)	
	
The	 "postulate"	underlying	a	 "perfect	 cosmology"	 cannot	 rely	on	 "any	matter	of	 fact,"	which	
would	then	have	to	be	accepted	as	inexplicable.	Peirce	could	never	countenance	this,	because	
it	blocks	the	way	of	inquiry	(CP	1.139,	EP	2:49,	RLT13	179-180;	1898).	Instead:	
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That	 perfect	 cosmology	 must	 therefore	 show	 that	 the	 whole	 history	 of	 the	 three	
universes,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 and	 is	 to	 be,	would	 follow	 from	a	 premise	which	would	 not	
suppose	 them	 to	exist	 at	 all.	Moreover,	 such	premise	must	 in	actual	 fact	be	 true.	But	
that	 premise	 must	 represent	 a	 state	 of	 things	 in	 which	 the	 three	 universes	 were	
completely	nil.	Consequently,	whether	in	time	or	not,	the	three	universes	must	actually	
be	absolutely	necessary	results	of	a	state	of	utter	nothingness.	(R	844:7)	
	
But	how	can	anything	possibly—let	alone	actually,	much	less	necessarily—result	from	"a	state	
of	utter	nothingness"?	On	the	contrary,	in	that	state	there	can	be	no	super-order	at	all:	
	
We	cannot	ourselves	conceive	of	such	a	state	of	nility;	but	we	can	easily	conceive	that	
there	should	be	a	mind	that	could	conceive	 it,	 since,	after	all,	no	contradiction	can	be	
involved	 in	mere	nonexistence.	A	 state	 in	which	 there	 should	be	absolutely	no	 super-
order	whatsoever	would	 be	 such	 a	 state	 of	 nility.	 For	 all	 Being	 involves	 some	 kind	 of	
super-order	…	Any	such	super-order	would	be	a	super-habit.	Any	general	state	of	things	
whatsoever	would	be	a	super-order	and	a	super-habit.	(R	844:7)	
	
No	order,	no	uniformity,	no	habits,	no	generality,	and	thus	no	3ns—in	short,	there	is	no	Being	
within	 "such	 a	 state	 of	 nility,"	 because	 "all	 Being	 involves	 some	 kind	 of	 super-order."	
Consequently,	the	Reality	of	God—necessary	Being,	transcendent	3ns—is	the	only	postulate	or	
premise	that	can	account	for	the	reality	of	all	three	Universes,	without	already	assuming	it.	God	
as	eternal	mind	conceived	the	state	of	nility,	and	then	created	everything	else:	
	
In	that	state	of	absolute	nility,	in	or	out	of	time,	that	is,	before	or	after	the	evolution	of	
time,	there	must	then	have	been	a	tohu-bohu	of	which	nothing	whatever	affirmative	or	
negative	was	 true	 universally.	 There	must	 have	 been,	 therefore,	 a	 little	 of	 everything	
conceivable.	(R	844:7-8)	
	
This	 is	an	allusion	to	Genesis	1:2;	the	Hebrew	phrase	tohu	wa	bohu	 is	translated	as	"formless	
and	 void,"	 and	 Peirce	 elsewhere	 identified	 it	 with	 "the	 indeterminate	 germinal	 Nothing"	 (R	
942:19;	c.	1898).	He	also	once	described	the	initial	situation	in	semeiotic	terms	reminiscent	of	
the	opening	statement	of	the	Gospel	of	John,	"In	the	beginning	was	the	Word	[logos]":	
	
If	we	 are	 to	 explain	 the	 universe,	we	must	 assume	 that	 there	was	 in	 the	 beginning	 a	
state	of	 things	 in	which	 there	was	nothing,	 no	 reaction	and	no	quality,	 no	matter,	 no	
consciousness,	no	space	and	no	time,	but	just	nothing	at	all.	Not	determinately	nothing.	
For	 that	 which	 is	 determinately	 not	A	 supposes	 the	 being	 of	A	 in	 some	mode.	 Utter	
indetermination.	 But	 a	 symbol	 alone	 is	 indeterminate.	 Therefore,	 Nothing,	 the	
indeterminate	 of	 the	 absolute	 beginning,	 is	 a	 symbol.	 That	 is	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	
beginning	of	things	can	alone	be	understood.	(EP	2:322;	c.	1904)	
	
Rather	than	"utter	nothingness,"	it	was	"utter	indetermination,"	and	thus	"a	little	of	everything	
conceivable"—an	infinite	spectrum	of	genuine	possibilities,	but	still	no	actualities	or	necessities:	
	 	
We	start,	then,	with	nothing,	pure	zero	…	It	is	the	germinal	nothing,	in	which	the	whole	
universe	is	involved	or	foreshadowed.	As	such,	it	is	absolutely	undefined	and	unlimited	
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possibility—boundless	 possibility.	 There	 is	 no	 compulsion	 and	 no	 law.	 It	 is	 boundless	
freedom.	
So	of	potential	being	there	was	in	that	initial	state	no	lack.	
Now	 the	question	 arises,	what	 necessarily	 resulted	 from	 that	 state	 of	 things?	But	 the	
only	sane	answer	is	that	where	freedom	was	boundless	nothing	in	particular	necessarily	
resulted.	(CP	6.217-218;	1898)	
	
This	 conforms	 to	 Peirce's	 definition	 of	 a	 continuum—which,	 like	 a	 symbol,	 is	 another	
paradigmatic	 example	 of	 3ns.	 It	 does	 not	 consist	 of	 any	multitude	 of	discrete	 individuals,	 as	
Georg	 Cantor	 and	 others	 held,	 but	 of	 potential	 individuals	 exceeding	 all	 multitude	 that	 are	
welded	 together,	 and	 hence	 indistinct	 (CP	 6.185,	 RLT	 247;	 1898).	 Even	 this	 description	 is	
misleading,	because	the	contiguous	individuals	do	not	comprise	the	continuum;	the	latter	is	the	
more	fundamental	concept	(CP	6.191,	RLT	258;	1898).	Continuity	is	generality,	and	generality	is	
impossible	in	the	absence	of	super-order	and	super-habit.	Finally,	from	CP	6.490:	
	
There	must	have	been	here	and	there	a	 little	undifferentiated	tendency	to	take	super-
habits.	But	 such	a	state	must	 tend	 to	 increase	 itself.	 For	a	 tendency	 to	act	 in	any	way	
combined	with	a	tendency	to	take	habits	must	increase	the	tendency	to	act	in	that	way.	
Now	substitute	in	this	general	statement	for	"tendency	to	act	in	any	way"	a	tendency	to	
take	 habits,	 and	 we	 see	 that	 that	 tendency	 would	 grow.	 It	 would	 also	 become	
differentiated	in	various	ways.	(R	844:8)	
	
This	says	much	the	same	thing	as	the	last	sentence	quoted	above	from	"A	Guess	at	the	Riddle."	
Clearly	Peirce	did	not	change	his	basic	cosmology	over	the	intervening	two	decades;	he	simply	
clarified	that	the	Reality	of	God	is	indispensable	to	it.14	
	
5.	Peirce's	Diagrammatic	Discourse	
Such	 an	 understanding	 is	 compatible	 with	 Peirce's	 extensive	 remarks	 on	 the	 subject	 in	 his	
eighth	and	final	Cambridge	Conferences	lecture	(CP	6.192-208,	RLT	258-263;	1898).	According	
to	that	detailed	account,	"the	existing	universe,	with	all	its	arbitrary	secondness,	is	an	offshoot	
from,	 or	 an	 arbitrary	 determination	 of,	 a	world	 of	 ideas,	 a	 Platonic	world	 [1ns]"	 (CP	 6.192).	
However,	 "the	 process	 of	 derivation"	 began	 "in	 the	 utter	 vagueness	 of	 completely	
undetermined	 and	 dimensionless	 potentiality	 [3ns]"	 (CP	 6.193);	 it	 was	 "a	 contraction	 of	 the	
vagueness	of	that	potentiality	of	everything	in	general,	but	of	nothing	in	particular"	(CP	6.196).	
As	a	result,	"The	general	indefinite	potentiality	became	limited	and	heterogeneous"	(CP	6.199);	
specifically:	
	
The	very	first	and	most	fundamental	element	that	we	have	to	assume	is	a	Freedom,	or	
Chance,	or	Spontaneity	[1ns],	by	virtue	of	which	the	general	vague	nothing-in-particular-
ness	 [3ns]	 that	 preceded	 the	 chaos	 took	 a	 thousand	 definite	 qualities.	 The	 second	
element	we	have	 to	assume	 is	 that	 there	could	be	accidental	 reactions	 [2ns]	between	
those	 qualities.	 The	 qualities	 themselves	 are	 mere	 eternal	 possibilities.	 But	 these	
reactions	we	must	think	of	as	events.	(CP	6.200)	
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Within	space	and	time,	"all	that	there	 is,	 is	First,	Feelings;	Second,	Efforts;	Third,	Habits";	and	
ultimately,	"dead	matter	would	be	merely	the	final	result	of	the	complete	 induration	of	habit	
reducing	 the	 free	 play	 of	 feeling	 and	 the	brute	 irrationality	 of	 effort	 to	 complete	 death"	 (CP	
6.201).	
Peirce's	 goal	 throughout	 this	 discussion	 was	 "to	 secure	 to	 thirdness	 its	 really	 commanding	
function,"	while	recognizing	"that	Firstness,	or	chance,	and	Secondness,	or	Brute	reaction,	are	
other	elements,	without	the	independence	of	which	Thirdness	would	not	have	anything	upon	
which	to	operate"	(CP	6.202).	As	"the	clue	…	to	guide	us	through	the	maze,"	he	proposed	that	
"the	 clean	 blackboard"	 can	 serve	 as	 "a	 sort	 of	 Diagram	 of	 the	 original	 vague	 potentiality,"	
differing	 from	 it	 by	 having	 only	 two	 dimensions	 rather	 than	 "some	 indefinite	 multitude	 of	
dimensions."	A	chalk	line	drawn	on	the	blackboard	represents	the	spontaneous	introduction	of	
a	brute	discontinuity.	However,	the	mark	itself	it	is	not	really	a	line;	it	is	a	surface	with	its	own	
continuity,	which	is	entirely	derived	from	and	dependent	on	that	of	the	underlying	blackboard.	
The	only	true	 line	 is	the	 limit	of	the	white	and	black	areas,	and	this	 is	the	discontinuity—"the	
reaction	between	two	continuous	surfaces	into	which	it	is	separated"	(CP	6.203).	
Peirce	 thus	 acknowledged	 that	 all	 three	 Categories—whiteness	 or	 blackness	 (1ns),	 their	
boundary	 (2ns),	 and	 the	 continuity	 of	 each	 (3ns)—are	 necessary	 for	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 chalk	
mark	(CP	6.205).	However,	the	continuity	of	the	blackboard	(3ns)	is	primordial,	in	the	sense	that	
its	reality	precedes	and	sustains	that	of	anything	drawn	upon	it;	this	is	"its	really	commanding	
function."	A	chalk	mark	that	persists,	rather	than	being	erased,	represents	the	establishment	of	
a	habit—which	is	also	entirely	derived	from	and	dependent	on	the	continuity	of	the	underlying	
blackboard:	
	
This	habit	is	a	generalizing	tendency,	and	as	such	a	generalization,	and	as	such	a	general,	
and	as	such	a	continuum	or	continuity.	It	must	have	its	origin	in	the	original	continuity	
which	 is	 inherent	 in	 potentiality.	 Continuity,	 as	 generality,	 is	 inherent	 in	 potentiality,	
which	is	essentially	general.	(CP	6.204)	
	
As	additional	marks	are	drawn	and	persist,	 they	 join	 together	due	to	other	developing	habits	
and	 become	 "reacting	 systems,"	 which	 aggregate	 and	 merge	 into	 larger	 such	 systems	 (CP	
6.206-207).	 Eventually,	 "out	 of	 one	 of	 these	 Platonic	 worlds	 is	 differentiated	 the	 particular	
actual	universe	of	existence	in	which	we	happen	to	be"	(CP	6.208).	
This	was	not	the	first	time	that	Peirce	had	employed	such	an	illustration	during	the	Cambridge	
Conferences	series.	In	the	third	lecture,	he	stated:	
	
The	whole	 universe	 of	 true	 and	 real	 possibilities	 forms	 a	 continuum,	 upon	which	 this	
Universe	 of	 Actual	 Existence	 is,	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 essential	 Secondness	 of	 Existence,	 a	
discontinuous	mark—like	a	 line	 figure	drawn	on	 the	area	of	 the	blackboard.	 (RLT	162;	
1898)	
	
We	can	harmonize	the	two	passages	by	invoking	an	aspect	of	Peirce's	concept	of	a	continuum	
that	he	attributed	to	Immanuel	Kant:	It	is	"that	of	which	every	part	has	parts	of	the	same	kind"	
(CP	 6.168;	 1903).	 Each	 "Platonic	 world"	 is	 represented	 on	 the	 continuous	 blackboard	 by	 a	
melded	 group	 of	white	marks,	 so	 these	must	 also	 be	 conceived	 collectively	 as	 a	 continuous	
blackboard	 in	some	sense.	For	 the	sake	of	clarity,	 let	us	differentiate	 the	 latter	by	calling	 it	a	
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"whiteboard"	 instead,	 noting	 again	 that	 its	 own	 continuity	 is	 entirely	 derived	 from	 and	
dependent	 on	 that	 of	 the	 underlying	 blackboard.	 It	 is	 then	 "a	 discontinuous	 mark"	 on	 one	
particular	whiteboard	that	represents	"this	Universe	of	Actual	Existence."	
Peirce	 declared	 plainly	 the	 pedagogical	 approach	 that	 he	 was	 utilizing	 by	 describing	 his	
cosmology	 in	 such	 terms:	 "Now	 the	 clue	 that	 I	 mentioned	 consists	 in	 making	 our	 thought	
diagrammatic	and	mathematical,	by	treating	generality	 from	the	point	of	view	of	geometrical	
continuity,	 and	by	experimenting	upon	 the	diagram"	 (CP	6.204).15	As	he	had	explained	 years	
earlier:	
	
[Diagrammatic	 reasoning]	 consists	 of	 constructing	 an	 icon	 or	 diagram	 the	 relations	 of	
whose	parts	 shall	present	a	complete	analogy	with	 those	of	 the	parts	of	 the	object	of	
reasoning,	of	 experimenting	upon	 this	 image	 in	 the	 imagination,	 and	of	observing	 the	
result	so	as	to	discover	unnoticed	and	hidden	relations	among	the	parts.	(CP	3.363,	EP	
1:227;	1885)	
	
Furthermore,	"The	skeletonization	or	diagrammatization	of	the	problem	serves	more	purposes	
than	one;	but	its	principal	purpose	is	to	strip	the	significant	relations	of	all	disguise"	(CP	3.559;	
1898).	Two	questions	now	arise:	What	are	 the	 relevant	parts	of	 the	blackboard	diagram,	and	
what	significant	relations	does	it	embody	and	expose?	Initially	it	seems	that	the	only	parts	are	
the	blackboard	itself	and	the	chalk	marks	upon	it;	and	the	only	relations	are	the	discontinuity	of	
the	boundary	between	black	and	white,	and	how	the	continuity	of	the	marks	depends	on	that	
of	the	underlying	blackboard.	The	aggregation	of	persistent	marks	entails	additional	relations.	
With	further	consideration	comes	the	recognition	that	chalk	marks	do	not	just	randomly	appear	
on	 a	blackboard,	 especially	not	 in	 intelligible	patterns	 such	as	 the	 "new	curve"	 that	 emerges	
when	they	"multiply	themselves	under	the	habit	of	being	tangent	to	the	envelope"	(CP	6.206).	
Instead,	 someone	 has	 to	 draw	 them;	 and	 this	 person's	 relation	 to	 them	 is	 that	 of	 creator	 to	
creation:	
	
Those	who	express	the	idea	to	themselves	by	saying	that	the	Divine	Creator	determined	
so	and	so	may	be	incautiously	clothing	the	idea	in	a	garb	that	is	open	to	criticism,	but	it	
is,	after	all,	 substantially	 the	only	philosophical	answer	 to	 the	problem.	 (CP	6.199,	RLT	
259;	1898)	
	
As	Peirce	later	wrote:	
	
A	 chaos	 of	 reactions	 utterly	 without	 any	 approach	 to	 law	 is	 absolutely	 nothing;	 and	
therefore	pure	nothing	was	 such	 a	 chaos.	 Then	pure	 indeterminacy	having	developed	
determinate	possibilities,	creation	consisted	in	mediating	between	the	lawless	reactions	
and	the	general	possibilities	by	the	influx	of	a	symbol.	This	symbol	was	the	purpose	of	
creation.	Its	object	was	the	entelechy	of	being	which	is	the	ultimate	representation.	(EP	
2:324;	c.	1904)	
	
God	as	Ens	necessarium,	eternal	pure	mind,	creative	of	 thought	 (third	Universe),	 imagines	an	
inexhaustible	 continuum	 of	 real	 possibilities	 and	 their	 combinations	 (first	 Universe),	 and	
exercises	perfect	freedom	in	choosing	which	of	these	to	actualize	(second	Universe).	This	is	the	
Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822  
	
 14	
hierarchy	 of	 Being	 in	 terms	 of	 Peirce's	 three	 Categories	 (3ns→1ns→2ns).	 The	 sequence	 of	
events	 in	 each	 case	 consists	 of	 spontaneity	 followed	 by	 reaction	 and	 then	 habit-taking	
(1ns→2ns→3ns).	The	evolution	of	states	within	our	existing	universe	(CP	1.409,	EP	1.277;	1887-
1888)	 is	 from	 complete	 chaos	 in	 the	 infinite	 past,	 through	 this	 ongoing	 process	 at	 any	
assignable	date,	to	complete	regularity	in	the	infinite	future	(1ns→3ns→2ns).16	
	
6.	Peirce's	Semeiotic	Synechism	
In	other	words,	cosmology	is	not	reducible	to	cosmogony;	it	concerns	not	only	what	occurred	in	
the	distant	past,	but	also	what	is	happening	right	now:	
	
This	 development	 of	 Reason	 consists,	 you	 will	 observe,	 in	 embodiment,	 that	 is,	 in	
manifestation.	The	creation	of	 the	universe,	which	did	not	 take	place	during	a	 certain	
busy	week,	 in	the	year	4004	B.C.,	but	 is	going	on	today	and	never	will	be	done,	 is	 this	
very	developement	of	Reason	…	Under	this	conception,	the	 ideal	of	conduct	will	be	to	
execute	 our	 little	 function	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 creation	 by	 giving	 a	 hand	 toward	
rendering	the	world	more	reasonable	whenever,	as	the	slang	is,	it	is	"up	to	us"	to	do	so.	
In	logic,	it	will	be	observed	that	knowledge	is	reasonableness;	and	the	ideal	of	reasoning	
will	 be	 to	 follow	 such	 methods	 as	 must	 develope	 knowledge	 the	 most	 speedily.	 (CP	
1.615,	EP	2:255;	1903)	
	
We	have	 the	opportunity	 to	participate	voluntarily	 in	God's	 still-unfolding	creative	activity	by	
"rendering	the	world	more	reasonable."	In	semeiotic	terms:	
	
…	the	universe	 is	a	vast	representamen,	a	great	symbol	of	God's	purpose,	working	out	
its	conclusions	in	living	realities.	Now	every	symbol	must	have,	organically	attached	to	it,	
its	 Indices	of	Reactions	and	 its	 Icons	of	Qualities;	and	such	part	as	these	reactions	and	
these	 qualities	 play	 in	 an	 argument	 that,	 they	 of	 course,	 play	 in	 the	 universe—that	
Universe	being	precisely	an	argument	…	The	Universe	as	an	argument	 is	necessarily	 a	
great	work	of	art,	a	great	poem—for	every	fine	argument	is	a	poem	and	a	symphony—
just	as	every	true	poem	is	a	sound	argument.	(CP	5.119,	EP	2:193-194;	1903)	
	
According	to	Peirce,	"Reality,	therefore,	can	only	be	regarded	as	the	limit	of	the	endless	series	
of	symbols.	A	symbol	 is	essentially	a	purpose,	 that	 is	 to	say,	 is	a	representation	that	seeks	to	
make	itself	definite,	or	seeks	to	produce	an	interpretant	more	definite	than	itself"	(EP	2:323;	c.	
1904).	Moreover,	"An	Argument	is	a	sign	which	distinctly	represents	the	Interpretant,	called	its	
Conclusion,	 which	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 determine"	 (CP	 2.95;	 1902).	 In	 the	 published	 article,	 he	
stated,	 "An	 'Argument'	 is	 any	 process	 of	 thought	 reasonably	 tending	 to	 produce	 a	 definite	
belief"	(CP	6.456,	EP	2:435,	R	841:6),	and	later	added:	
	
The	 hypothesis	 of	 God	 is	 a	 peculiar	 one,	 in	 that	 it	 supposes	 an	 infinitely	
incomprehensible	object,	although	every	hypothesis,	as	such,	supposes	its	object	to	be	
truly	 conceived	 in	 the	 hypothesis.	 This	 leaves	 the	 hypothesis	 but	 one	 way	 of	
understanding	 itself;	 namely,	 as	 vague	 but	 as	 true	 so	 far	 as	 it	 is	 definite,	 and	 as	
continually	 tending	 to	 define	 itself	 more	 and	 more,	 and	 without	 limit	 …	 Thus,	 the	
hypothesis	will	 lead	to	our	thinking	of	features	of	each	Universe	as	purposed;	and	this	
will	stand	or	fall	with	the	hypothesis.	Yet	a	purpose	essentially	involves	growth,	and	so	
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cannot	 be	 attributed	 to	God.	 Still	 it	will,	 according	 to	 the	 hypothesis,	 be	 less	 false	 to	
speak	so,	than	to	represent	God	as	purposeless.	(CP	6.466,	EP	2:439-440,	R	841:29-31)	
	
In	 summary,	 our	 existing	 universe	 is	 a	 Representamen—specifically,	 an	 Argument,	 and	
therefore	a	Symbol;	a	manifestation	primarily	of	3ns,	but	necessarily	involving	elements	of	1ns	
(Icons	of	Qualities)	and	2ns	(Indices	of	Reactions).	The	Dynamic	Object	is	God	Himself,	infinitely	
incomprehensible	to	us;	and	the	Immediate	Object	is	God's	purpose,	which	is	the	development	
of	 Reason—including	 the	 growth	 of	 our	 knowledge	 of	 God,	 and	 of	 all	 three	 Universes	 of	
Experience	 that	He	has	 created	and	 is	 still	 creating.	 The	 Interpretant	 is	 the	Conclusion,	 living	
realities	 that	 our	 existing	 universe	 is	 constantly	 working	 out—the	 Immediate	 Interpretant	
serving	as	the	range	of	possibilities	from	which	individual	Dynamic	Interpretants	are	actualized,	
and	the	habit-taking	tendency	developing	some	of	these	into	Final	Interpretants.	This	Argument	
produces	 a	 belief	 that	 is	 initially	 vague,	 but	 continually	 becomes	 more	 and	 more	 definite,	
without	limit.17	
We	are	at	last	in	a	position	to	understand	Peirce's	reply	to	the	objection	that	the	competence	
of	humanity's	instinctive	reason	is	limited	to	"the	secrets	of	nature."	If	the	cosmology	detailed	
above	is	correct,	then	there	is	no	such	discontinuity	in	Reality	itself,	our	experience	thereof,	or	
the	 knowledge	 that	 it	 provides.18	 Given	 the	 success	 of	 our	 spontaneous	 conjectures	 in	
mathematics,	 phenomenology,	 and	 the	 special	 sciences,	 why	 would	 metaphysics	 be	 any	
different?	Moreover,	God	is	not	completely	independent	of	the	third	Universe,	which	includes	
our	minds	and	continuity	 itself;	 and	our	disposition	 to	generate	 true	hypotheses	 is	especially	
well-suited	to	that	Category:	
	
It	appears	to	me	that	the	clearest	statement	we	can	make	of	the	logical	situation—the	
freest	 from	 all	 questionable	 admixture—is	 to	 say	 that	man	 has	 a	 certain	 Insight,	 not	
strong	 enough	 to	 be	 oftener	 right	 than	 wrong,	 but	 strong	 enough	 not	 to	 be	
overwhelmingly	 more	 often	 wrong	 than	 right,	 into	 the	 Thirdnesses,	 the	 general	
elements,	of	Nature.	(CP	5.173,	EP	2:217;	1903)	
	
Peirce's	 favorite	 name	 for	 his	 comprehensive	 system	 of	 thought	was	 "Synechism,	 because	 it	
rests	 on	 the	 study	 of	 continuity"	 (CP	 6.202,	 RLT	 261;	 1898)	 and	 "insists	 upon	 the	 idea	 of	
continuity	as	of	prime	 importance	 in	philosophy"	 (CP	6.169;	1902).	The	hypothesis	of	God	as	
Ens	necessarium	explains	not	only	the	origin	of	the	three	Universes	of	Experience,	but	also	their	
order	 (cosmos)—what	 "A	 Neglected	 Argument"	 calls	 the	 "homogeneities	 of	 connectedness"	
within	 each	 of	 them,	 as	well	 as	 the	 "homogeneities	 and	 connections	 between	 two	 different	
Universes,	 or	 all	 three"	 (CP	 6.464-465,	 EP	 2:438-439,	 R	 841:24&26).19	 Peirce	 went	 on	 to	
describe	the	natural	results	of	observing	and	contemplating	these	with	no	particular	agenda:	
	
…	in	the	Pure	Play	of	Musement	the	idea	of	God's	Reality	will	be	sure	sooner	or	later	to	
be	found	an	attractive	fancy,	which	the	Muser	will	develop	in	various	ways.	The	more	he	
ponders	it,	the	more	it	will	find	response	in	every	part	of	his	mind,	for	its	beauty,	for	its	
supplying	 an	 ideal	 of	 life,	 and	 for	 its	 thoroughly	 satisfactory	 explanation	 of	 his	whole	
threefold	environment.	(CP	6.465,	EP	2:439,	R	841:29)	
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…	any	normal	man	who	considers	the	three	Universes	 in	the	 light	of	the	hypothesis	of	
God's	 Reality,	 and	 pursues	 that	 line	 of	 reflexion	 in	 scientific	 singleness	 of	 heart,	 will	
come	 to	 be	 stirred	 to	 the	 depths	 of	 his	 nature	 by	 the	 beauty	 of	 the	 idea	 and	 by	 its	
august	 practicality,	 even	 to	 the	 point	 of	 earnestly	 loving	 and	 adoring	 his	 strictly	
hypothetical	God,	and	to	that	of	desiring	above	all	things	to	shape	the	whole	conduct	of	
life	 and	 all	 the	 springs	 of	 action	 into	 conformity	 with	 that	 hypothesis.	 Now	 to	 be	
deliberately	 and	 thoroughly	 prepared	 to	 shape	 one's	 conduct	 into	 conformity	 with	 a	
proposition	 is	 neither	 more	 nor	 less	 than	 the	 state	 of	 mind	 called	 Believing	 that	
proposition,	 however	 long	 the	 conscious	 classification	 of	 it	 under	 that	 head	 be	
postponed.	(CP	6.467,	EP	2:440,	R	841:32-34)	
	
The	 same	 outcomes	 presumably	 await	 each	 one	 of	 us	 who	 engages	 in	 good	 faith	 in	 such	
meditations	as	Peirce	recommended.20	
	
																																								 																				
Notes 
1 Citations given as CP with volume and paragraph number(s) and year(s) originally written are 
from (Peirce 1931-1958). 
2 Citations given as EP with volume and page number(s) and year(s) originally written are from 
(Peirce 1992-1998). 
3 Citations of Peirce given as R with manuscript number(s) and year originally written are per 
(Robin 1967). The manuscripts are maintained by Houghton Library at Harvard University. Page 
numbers correspond to the microfilm sequence as reproduced in the digital images made 
available online (http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16) by the Scalable 
Peirce Interpretation Network (SPIN), followed by Peirce's handwritten page numbers [in square 
brackets] where he provided ones that differ. 
4 Richmond (2005) introduced these handy abbreviations (also 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm). They are especially 
useful when diagramming relations in terms of Peirce's Categories; in particular, the six possible 
"vectors" for moving through them (see note 16).	
5 Clarke (1977) highlighted this difficulty and derived "the outline of a scientific methodology 
for theology" (p. 286) from Peirce's solutions in CP 6.490-491. Daniel-Hughes (2015) similarly 
distilled "a Peircean program for theology" (p. 121) from the article as a whole. 
6 Reuter (1994) was highly critical of the published article because it "fails to accomplish what it 
sets out to do: compel belief in the reality of God" (p. 290); but Peirce's actual objective was 
clearly much less ambitious. In fact, Canteñs (2004) recognized that, "if one finds Peirce's 
argument persuasive, then the classical and contemporary evidentialist's criteria for determining 
what is to be considered a rationally justified belief in the reality of God is undermined" (p. 771). 
7 Atkins (2016) offered a comparable formalization, using Peirce's alternative term for 
retroduction: "(1) Abduction is a valid inference form under the conditions noted earlier. (2) 
Certain lines of thought that lead to belief in God's reality are abductive inferences that satisfy 
those conditions. So, (3) belief in God's reality is rationally acceptable" (p. 112). The conditions 
are: "(1) one has no significant countervailing reasons to deny it, (2) it explains some 
phenomenon, (3) it has experimental consequences such that it can be put to the test, and (4) it is 
natural in the sense that it is the one instinct suggests" (p. 110). 
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8 Nubiola (2004) focused on this aspect of "A Neglected Argument" and presented it as a 
properly formulated abduction (CP 5.189, EP 2:231): 
 
The efficiency of the scientist (guessing right between innumerable hypotheses) is a 
really surprising fact. 
If God were the creator of human cognitive abilities and of nature this efficiency would 
be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that God is the creator of human minds and nature. 
 
However, as Gary Fuhrman pointed out in e-mail correspondence, "human minds and nature 
come from the same source" and "human minds are part of nature" are equally plausible 
explanations that do not require the Reality of God. 
9 It is impossible to provide an adequate explanation of Peirce's Categories in a few sentences. 
Very briefly, they are the only three types of indecomposable elements that together comprise 
"the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless 
of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not" (CP 1.284; 1905). 1ns is quality, feeling, 
spontaneity, vagueness, possibility; 2ns is reaction, effort, bruteness, determinacy, actuality; and 
3ns is mediation, thought, purpose, generality, regularity. All three Categories are always there in 
every phenomenon, but one of them may be predominant from a particular point of view. For 
example, in Peirce's semeiotic, an icon, such as a painting, primarily relates to its object through 
some kind of resemblance (1ns); an index, such as a fingerprint, due to a physical or other direct 
connection (2ns); and a symbol, such as a word, by means of a convention or rule (3ns). For one 
of Peirce's most extensive expositions of his Categories, see CP 1.417-520 (c. 1896). 
10 Nathan Houser's introductory retelling of "Peirce's cosmological story" (EP 1:xxxii-xxxiii) is 
typical in this regard. His statement that, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is 
self-actualizing" reflects what is problematic about such an interpretation—it leaves the 
emergence of something from nothing, or at least the crucial transition from 1ns (possibility) to 
2ns (actuality), unexplained. Examples of other relevant passages include CP 6.585 (1890), CP 
8.317 (1891), CP 6.33 (EP 1:297; 1891), CP 6.262 (EP 1:347; 1892), and CP 6.606&612 (1893). 
Some of them begin to anticipate the later developments that are emphasized in this essay. 
11 The six articles appear as CP 6.7-34, CP 6.35-65, CP 6.102-163, CP 6.238-271, CP 6.287-317, 
and CP 6.588-618; the first five also appear as EP 1:285-371. They include the last four of the 
six passages referenced in note 10. 
12 Peirce supposedly had intended to author a seventh installment that would have clarified this 
very point: 
 
Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and synthetising the ideas 
of the other articles of a series in the early volumes of The Monist ever been written, it 
would have appeared how, with thorough consistency, that theory involved the 
recognition that continuity is an indispensable element of reality … Yet even in its 
truncated condition, an extra-intelligent reader might discern that the theory of those 
cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more than feeling [1ns] and 
action [2ns] could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where those two elements 
were present, was explicitly shown to be pure nothing … the third category—the 
category of thought, representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine thirdness, 
thirdness as such—is an essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute 
reality, since this category (which in that cosmology appears as the element of habit) can 
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have no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to work its 
government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling on which 
to act. (CP 5.436, EP 2:345; 1905) 
 
13 Citations given as RLT with page number(s) are from (Peirce 1992). 
14 Short (2011) curiously denied that Peirce ultimately had a cosmology at all, claiming that he 
abandoned any such notion after 1898, only briefly mentioning the passage quoted in note 12, 
and saying nothing about CP 6.490. By contrast, Rohatyn (1982) described the latter as "an 
interesting and worthwhile argument for the existence [sic] of God" (p. 68). He rearranged it into 
an Argumentation in Peirce's sense (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, R 841:6), with nine distinct steps, and 
then raised five objections. In a delightful twist, Rohatyn proceeded to answer them on Peirce's 
behalf, concluding that CP 6.490 "is a defensible piece of tightly controlled cosmological 
speculation, worthy of our philosophical attention" (p. 73). 
15 Hull (2005) suggested that "the method for arriving at the God-hypothesis is fundamentally 
tied to a general theory about the use of diagrams in our reasoning" (p. 494), and that this is what 
Peirce meant by "a theory of the nature of thinking" in CP 6.491. 
16 Guardiano (2015) also discerned three distinct but complementary interpretations of Peirce's 
cosmological writings by adopting each individual Category's point of view when analyzing 
them. As arranged in this paragraph of the essay, they align with the perspectives that Guardiano 
associated with 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively. Because of such "trichotomic logic" and other 
"unique theoretical merits," he argued that "Peirce's theory amounts to a reasonable abduction" 
(p. 313). Richmond (2005) labeled the corresponding vectors as "representation," "order," and 
"process," respectively (p. 460). 
17 A semeiotic cosmology is to be expected, if indeed the hierarchy of Being follows the vector 
of representation (see note 16). Raposa (1989) understood Peirce's approach as a "theosemiotic" 
in which "the problem of religious knowledge is to be conceived primarily as a problem of sign-
interpretation" (p. 148). Atkins (2016) called the sharing of a true belief by multiple persons 
"cognitive welding" (p. 154) and added, "When all of our external cognitions [3ns], wills [2ns], 
and sentiments [1ns] overlap with God's, then we will all be welded into the universal 
continuum. This unity is not yet understood in our sciences but can be comprehended in poetry 
and in religion" (p. 163).	
18 Raposa (1989) made much the same point: "If all of reality is continuous, then everything is 
potentially a sign of God's presence" (p. 146). Daniel-Hughes (2015) commented that what is 
often named "the scientific argument" in the secondary literature—"the third argument of the 
nest" (CP 6.488, EP 2:446, R 844:2)—would be better designated as "the continuity argument" 
(p. 122, note 4). 
19 Hull (2005) posited that the published article "may be read as Peirce's offering toward a 
method of reasoning about true continua" (p. 498). In her view, this involves treating the three 
Universes of Experience as mathematical sets or collections, and then using diagrams to explore 
their relations. The blackboard illustration was her primary example. 
20 This essay was prompted by a series of discussions that took place via the Peirce-L e-mail list 
(http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm) in the late summer and early autumn of 
2016. I appreciate the helpful feedback that I received from the diverse community of inquirers 
who participate in that forum. I am especially grateful to the moderator, Gary Richmond, who 
(among other things) introduced me to the notion that the blackboard in Peirce's diagram 
represents a kind of "ur-continuity" or primordial 3ns, which served as a theater for the 
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emergence of all three Categories as we experience them in our existing universe; Edwina 
Taborsky, who disagreed with me forcefully on multiple occasions, thereby repeatedly 
challenging me to sharpen my thinking and argumentation; and Jeffrey Downard, who founded 
SPIN and directed me to its website (see note 3), which will surely be an invaluable resource to 
Peirce scholars for many years to come. I also owe thanks to the anonymous reviewers who 
provided helpful suggestions that improved the final version of the text. 
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